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pilot unitjbr the company's franchise network') 
which was owned and run by him personally 
and which had nothing whatsoever to do with 
his position as a director of the company. In 
other words the relevant knowledge and 
experience was entirely his qua Mr Mistlin, and 
not his cjua director. Indeed I would go so Jar 
as to say that, in reality, Mr Mistlin held 
himself out as personally responsible for the 
only available figures to support the projections, 
as was indeed thejact.'
In concluding his judgment Hirst LJ 
expressed the view that there was no risk, 
on the particular facts of this case, of 
compromising the general concept of 
limited liability. Waite LJ agreed. A 
dissenting judgment was delivered by Sir 
Patrick Russell.
Few franchisees who fail in business 
blame themselves. All franchisors run the 
risk of claims arising out of pre- 
contractual representations which they 
make to prospective franchisees either in 
pre-contract documentation such as 
franchise brochures, or in negotiations.
' o
Larger organisations may have difficulty 
controlling what may be said by a range
of staff from the telephone receptionist 
to the franchise sales director. The 
Natural Life case points out that smaller 
franchisors have a higher exposure risk. 
This case does turn on its facts to some 
extent. The franchisor company was in its 
infancy. It had no real experience. The 
experience it offered to prospective 
franchisees was that of the single
o
founding director. Its marketingo o
literature claimed experience it did not 
have. When the financial projections 
were provided to the plaintiffs, the 
franchisor company had no other 
franchisees with any relevant experience 
to provide a basis for them.
For new businesses who want to 
franchise, this case sends these messages:
  learn about franchising before selling 
franchises;
  sell the franchises yourself. Do not use 
intermediaries;
  only claim that you have a proven 
system if you actually do have one;
  do not pluck sales figures out of the air 
and dress them up as profit forecasts. 
For a franchisee the most important 
factor when he buys will be working 
out realistic and supportable
projections for sales, expenses and 
profits. No franchisee has the 
experience to do this. It is only a 
franchisor who is able to supply 
accurate information, with appropriate 
clarifications and disclaimers;
  officers of a company should avoid 
making statements in a personal 
capacity. @
FRANCHISORS' RISK
Few franchisees who fail in business blame 
themselves. All franchisors run the risk of 
claims arising out of pre-contractual 
representations which they make to 
prospective franchisees either in pre- 
contract documentation such as franchise 
brochures, or in negotiations. Larger 
organisations may have difficulty controlling 
what may be said by a range of staff from the 
telephone receptionist to the franchise sales 
director.
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Trusts & Equity
How dumb is the blind trust?
A common phenomenon in the 
modern offshore trust world is the so- 
called blind trust. Typically, a nominal 
trust fund   say £10   is declared by a 
professional offshore trustee to be held 
on the terms of a lengthy and 
sophisticated trust deed. In substance, 
this amounts to discretionary trusts of 
income and capital, during the longest 
period allowed by the governing law, for 
the benefit of a defined class of objects. 
Again typically this class at the outset 
contains only one or two members. They 
will be charities of worldwide reputation, 
such as the International Red Cross.
The trust deed also confers power on 
the trustee to add further persons to the 
class. Some time after the original 
declaration of trust, the settlor decants 
substantial wealth into the hands of the 
trustee, on the same trusts. But, because 
the original deed is a unilateral
o
declaration of trust by the trustee, the
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identity of this real settlor nowhere 
appears. Later still, the trustee   at the 
'suggestion' of the settlor   appoints 
persons, who just happen to be his or her 
relatives or even himself or herself, into 
the class of objects, and then   surprise, 
surprise   the trustee appoints significant 
wealth out of the trust fund to them.
Such trusts have been known in the 
offshore world for years (see eg Re Gea 
Settlement, 17 March 1992, Royal Court 
of Jersey). Those who promote such 
trusts say they are cheap to set up, 
flexible, and may prevent intended 
beneficiaries having too many rights until 
appointed into the class (compare West v 
Lazard Brothers &^ Co (Jersey) Limited 
1987-88 JLR N-22). All true. They are 
also a godsend to the shifty, the secretive 
and the downright fraudulent. And in any 
event the bit about charity is almost 
certainly a sham. In bad cases the whole 
thing will be.
TRUST'S DISSERVICE
But my purpose here is not to point 
out these obvious truths. It is to say that, 
even if the blind trust is utterly genuine, 
it may do a real disservice to those who 
create it. This is illustrated by a recent 
decision of the Isle of Man Court of 
Appeal (actually called the Staff of 
Government Division), Ahuja v Scheme 
Manager, Depositor's Compensation Scheme (8 
April 1997, unreported).
Here a blind trust was set up in 1989 
by eight persons, all related. Unusually, 
two of them appeared in the trust as 
settlors and trustees. But essentially it 
was a nominal sum held on discretionary 
trusts for a class which, at the date of 
setting up, contained only one object, 
namely the International Red Cross. This 
was also the beneficiary in default of 
appointment. One week after being 
created, two events occurred. First, the
eight persons were added to the class of
o I
objects (so there were then nine), and 
second, a trust account was set up at the 
Isle of Man branch of BCCI. Substantial 
further funds were then added to the 
trust fund. In total the sum amounted to 
some £160,000, each of the eight 
persons contributing about £20,000.
BCCI collapsed in 1991. The Isle of 
Man bank deposit compensation scheme 
would pay three-quarters of a maximum 
loss of £20,000, i.e. £15,000, to a 
depositor in a Manx bank. Each of the 
eight persons claimed that maximum of 
£15,000. The scheme manager, 
considering the regulations covering the 
scheme, disallowed their claims. He 
allowed a single suit of £15,000 to theO '
trustees.
If this had been a bare trust for the 
eight persons, each could have claimed 
under the regulations in his or her own 
right. But it was not. Instead, undero '
reg. 9(3)(e), a deposit by trustees of the 
trust was to be treated as one account:
'unless the beneficiaries of the trust are 
individuals whose identity and right to benefit 
can be conclusively established'.
UNTRUSTWORTHY
Those who promote such trusts say they are 
cheap to set up, flexible, and may prevent 
intended beneficiaries having too many rights 
until appointed into the class ... All true. 
They are also a godsend to the shifty, the 
secretive and the downright fraudulent.
NO REMEDY
At first instance, the court said that the 
beneficiaries' identities and their right to 
benefit could be conclusively established.
It was not necessary that any 
appointment out be made in favour of 
the eight persons. It was sufficient that 
they had been added to the class. This, of 
course, proves too much. It the eight 
individual members of the class were 
entitled to compensation, why not the 
ninth member, the International Red 
Cross? But no one was concerned to 
argue for them. And, almost certainly, no 
one ever intended them to benefit 
anyway.
On appeal, the Judge of Appeal, Benet 
Hytner QC, took a different view. 
Although the eight persons had been 
added to the class, no appointment had 
been made in their favour. Thus, it could 
not be said that the right of the 
beneficiaries to benefit could be
conclusively established. The trustees 
might have appointed the whole to the 
International Red Cross, or made no 
appointment at all, so that it vested in the 
International Red Cross at the end of the 
trust period.
So the eight persons who had 
contributed £160,000 had to be satisfied 
with compensation paid to the trustees of 
just £15,000 (they would, of course, also 
obtain some sort of modest dividend 
from the liquidation of the bank). The 
question to be asked is, why did they use 
this kind of trust?
TRUST'S DUBIOUS 
ATTRACTIONS
Well, first, they may not have wanted a 
bare trust. Perhaps tax reasons made that 
unattractive, though strictly speaking (as 
far as UK tax is concerned) any UK 
settlors amongst the eight would pay tax 
on the income whether they received it 
or not, as they had not been excluded 
from all benefits. So even an ordinary 
discretionary trust with them in the class 
would have meant that they were still 
taxable. Perhaps they thought   or were 
advised   that a blind trust, where the 
real beneficiaries are not added till later, 
was somehow outside the tax rules, or 
was simply more difficult for a Revenue 
authority to see through. But, if that was 
the case, why did the trustees add the 
eight persons to the class of beneficiaries 
exactly one week after the execution of 
the trust deed and decant the substantial 
wealth into the trust account then?
Perhaps it was not tax but exchange 
control. At least two of the persons 
concerned lived in India. Did they think 
that a blind trust was outside the 
exchange control rules? Or would it just
be harder for a government to track 
down? We do not know.
But you cannot help thinking that the 
blind trust has been turned into a 
product: it's new, it's wonderful, it avoids 
taxes or exchange control. Well, it may or 
may not do that (though in any event it 
may not be the blind aspect that achieves 
it). However if the intention is to save in 
a bank account, rather than to invest in 
some other way, any kind ol discretionary 
trust   let alone a blind trust   is likely to 
take the beneficiaries outside the scope of 
compensation schemes.
TRENDY PRODUCT
You cannot help thinking that the blind trust 
has been turned into a product: it's new, it's 
wonderful, it avoids taxes or exchange 
control ... if the intention is to save in a bank 
account, rather than to invest in some other 
way, any kind of discretionary trust   let 
alone a blind trust   is likely to take the 
beneficiaries outside the scope of 
compensation schemes.
And so it proved here. Why did they 
not just put all the money in a bank 
account in their own names, or in the 
names of one of them for all? Look at Mr 
Anand, who did just that, without any 
trust deed, and the Special 
Commissioner accepted (as the Inland 
Revenue had not) that there was a bare 
trust for him and his three sons equally 
(see Anand v IRC (1996) Sp C 107).
Sometimes the simplest things are the 
best. ®
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